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9
In Defense of Animal Universalism
Shawn Graves, Blake Hereth, and Tyler M. John
In folk theology, it is sometimes claimed that non-human animals will join
humans in heaven for eternity. Others claim that animals could not possibly
join humans in heaven,1for they lack souls and are therefore incapable of
surviving their deaths. The status of animal eschatology in academic theology
is not significantly different. Some, like John Wesley, have implied that
animals will be ushered into heaven at some future time and remain there
for eternity.2 Others, like St Thomas Aquinas, have argued that animals are
not made of the right metaphysical stuff such that they can get to heaven.3
A few contemporary philosophers have argued that animals will enter heaven
as compensation for their suffering on earth, and another has argued that
heaven, by nature, is no place for animals.
We think that there is good reason to believe that all animals shall be
ushered into heaven and remain there for eternity.4 We therefore defend
Animal Universalism:
Animal Universalism: All sentient animals will be brought into heaven and
remain there for eternity.
By “all sentient animals” we mean all animals who have ever existed or will
exist who have the capacity for subjective experience while lacking the capacity
1 Here and elsewhere, “animals” refers exclusively to non-human animals. We are aware that
the common use of the word “animals” to refer only to non-human animals has arisen in large
part due to human prejudice, and that it can be and has been used to demean and diminish non-
human animals. Here, we cautiously use the word merely as a convenient shorthand.
2 Wesley (1872).
3 He writes, “Man is incorruptible in part, namely, in his rational soul, but not as a whole
because the composite is dissolved by death. Animals and plants and all mixed bodies are
incorruptible neither in whole nor in part. In the final state of incorruption, therefore, men
and the elements and the heavenly bodies will fittingly remain, but not other animals or plants or
mixed bodies” (Compendium, 170).
4 Our thesis therefore entails, but is stronger than, animal survivalism (the thesis that animals
survive death) or animal immortality (the thesis that animals never permanently cease to exist).
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for propositional agency (or the capacity to act on judgments about reasons).5
We focus on propositional agency as our exclusion criterion because we
believe such agency is necessary for the moral responsibility and autonomy
that many Christian philosophers believe excludes some humans from
heaven.6 By “heaven,” we mean the location or state of being described in
traditional Christian theism as being constitutive of a good afterlife.
Jerry Walls distinguishes between theocentric and anthropocentric models
of heaven, the latter of which “would include poetry, pianos, puppies, poppies,
and sex, all at their best” (2002: 7). While we are not committed to a view of
heaven where poetry, pianos, poppies, and sex exist, we are committed to a
view of heaven in which puppies and indeed all animals exist (though it is not
clear that this commits us to an “anthropocentric” model of heaven). We
mention this merely to show that our view does not contradict any settled
orthodox Christian view on the nature of heaven.7 For as Walls says, “Given
the variety of views along this spectrum, it is not easy to identify the orthodox
or traditional view of heaven” (7).8
We argue that Animal Universalism is the natural outflow of divine love
and justice. It is an axiom of contemporary Western Christian theology that
God9 is perfectly loving and just.10 If this is true, we argue, then Animal
Universalism is also true.
5 See Sebo (2015). We leave it open whether non-sentient animals will enter Heaven. In
addition, we leave it open whether it is non-human organisms, minds, souls, or other entities that
are brought into Heaven.
6 As Sebo (2015) argues, “if you punch me in the face on the grounds that you think that
I deserve to be punched, then it is at least plausible that you deserve praise or blame for your
behavior…. In contrast, if my dog bites my arm because he experiences my arm as to-be-bitten,
then it is not plausible that he deserves praise or blame for his behavior.” Jerry Walls (2002)
discusses at length the fact that “infants and children lack the cognitive and moral maturity” for
free will and moral responsibility (88–9).
7 This is not to say that our arguments are neutral with respect to which classical orthodox
model is true. Our arguments may well imply certain orthodox models of Heaven are false.
However, our arguments do not entail any obviously unorthodox model of Heaven.
8 Cf. Dougherty (2014: 158–62). Dougherty contends that theological figureheads from all
three branches of historical Christian orthodoxy (Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and
Protestant) support a view consistent with the thesis that animals can survive death. Indeed,
Dougherty argues that passages from these theological figures renders animal survivalism more
probable than not. Plausibly, since orthodoxy does not entail that surviving animals are damned
or at some point cease to exist, it is consistent with historical orthodoxy that animals (even all of
them) remain in Heaven for eternity. Thus, if animal survivalism is consistent with historical
Christian orthodoxy, so plausibly is animal universalism.
9 Some of our authors object to the use of “God,” as they regard it as problematically
masculine. However, we could not achieve consensus on an alternate term, so we refer to the
divine as the default “God” throughout this chapter.
10 On God’s perfect love, see 1 John 4; Lewis (1962: 39); Morris (1991: 177–9, 183); Talbott
(2007: 279–81); Walls (2002: 67, 81–6); and Walls (2007: 287). On God’s perfect justice, see:
Deuteronomy 32:4; Rowe (1986: 244–5); Stump (1985); and Wolterstorff (2008: 323–41). For
both, see Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, chs 91–3; Idziak (2007: 298–9); The
Westminster Confession of Faith, 9–10; and Wierenga (1989: 203).
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We begin by arguing that God acts in accordance with moral principles
regarding beings with direct moral status, and then offer reasons to believe
that animals have direct moral status. Several, but not all, of our remaining
arguments depend on God’s acting morally appropriately toward animals.
Next, we argue that the divine nature entails Animal Universalism.
Our first arguments are Arguments from Divine Love. One argument has as
its central premises that (1) God perfectly loves animals and that (2) perfect
love always aims to promote the flourishing of the beloved. We defend these
claims, and argue that they entail that God aims to maximize the well-being of
each individual animal when doing so does not harm other individual crea-
tures or violate creaturely freedom. God can only accomplish this aim by
guaranteeing Animal Universalism.
Our second divine love argument follows Thomas Talbott’s argument for
human universalism (but does not inherit its difficulties): namely, that the
redeemed cannot be supremely happy if they know that any of their loved ones
are eternally lost. Those who have robust relationships with animals care
about the well-being of these animals, and would be adversely affected by
the knowledge that particular animals have permanently lost their lives. More
significantly, the permanent loss of any individual animal would be a great
relational loss to God. We argue that if God can prevent the loss of these
relationships without sacrificing anything of comparable or greater moral
importance, then God will be compelled by perfect love to do so. Since God
can do so, God will guarantee Animal Universalism.
Next are Arguments from Divine Justice, which proceed as follows. Some
philosophers of religion have argued that it would be unjust for God to provide
humans with unequal opportunities for salvation. As Walls says, “God would
not give some persons many opportunities to repent and receive [God’s] grace
while giving others only minimal opportunities, or even none at all” (2002:
67).11 According to such arguments, no individual should be deprived of an
opportunity for salvation on arbitrary grounds such as time of birth, geograph-
ical location, intellectual abilities, sex, or race. We draw on the relevant work on
equality found in the animal ethics literature to argue that a plausible criterion
of justice further requires that no individual be deprived of an opportunity for
salvation on account of that individual’s species membership. If humans are
offered opportunities to enter and remain within heaven, it is unjust or objec-
tionably arbitrary for God to fail to extend animals the same offer. Thus, God’s
perfect justice compels God to offer an opportunity for eternal salvation to all
animals, which we argue no animal will reject. We then offer an additional
argument from justice which further supports Animal Universalism. Finally, we
respond to various objections to Animal Universalism.
11 See also Walls (2002: 81–6).
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9.1 . DIVINE DUTIES TO ANIMALS
We defend the following claims: (1) that God acts in accordance with moral
laws regarding those creatures that have direct moral status and (2) that
sentient animals have direct moral status. While these claims will strengthen
our arguments, few of our arguments will critically depend on God’s acting
morally appropriately toward animals. Even if God does not act in accordance
with moral laws regarding animals, God’s perfect love and justice compels
God to save all animals.
An argument for (1) is as follows. Christians and other theists frequently
make evaluative moral claims about God and God’s actions. These claims
often appear in worship contexts. For example, we claim that God is good and
that everything that God does is good. But to make these claims is, minimally,
to claim that what God does is morally appropriate, or is in accordance with
some moral principles. It is to claim that God does things that a morally good
agent would do were that agent in the same relevant circumstances. If it’s true
that God does not act in accordance with moral laws, then that’s because either
(a) God is acting in violation of those moral laws, and so fails to be good, or (b)
there is no moral standard with which God’s actions can be judged as morally
good or not morally good, and so God fails to be good. So, if God is good, then,
minimally, God’s acts are the subject of moral predicates, and are therefore
open to determinations about whether they are in accordance with moral laws.
Given the standard assumption that God is good, it follows that God acts in
accordance with moral laws.12
So, God acts in accordance with moral laws. That God acts in accordance
with moral laws regarding individuals with direct moral status follows just
from God’s acting in accordance with moral laws and the nature of moral
status. When we claim that S has direct moral status, what we mean is that S or
S’s interests matter morally for their own sake.13 So, if S has moral status, S has
some property such that S can be benefited and/or harmed simpliciter. In light
of this, there are moral laws regarding S—minimally, laws requiring agents to
benefit S and/or prohibiting agents from harming S. Given that God acts in
12 As Thomas Morris (1991) argues, this is true even if God is not the subject of moral
obligations. He writes, “Because of [God’s] distinctive nature, God does not share our ontological
status. Specifically, [God] does not share our relation to moral principles-that of being bound by
some of these principles as duties. Nevertheless, God acts perfectly in accordance with those
principles which would express duties for a moral agent in his relevant circumstances. And
[God] does so necessarily” (60–1). Similarly, some divine command theorists claim that God is
not the subject of moral obligations. To have a coherent account of divine goodness they, too,
should adopt Morris’s account. See Alston (1990); Duns Scotus in Cross (1999: 93–4); and
William of Ockham in Adams (1986).
13 Similarly, Jaworska and Tannenbaum (2013) say: “An entity has moral status if and only if
it or its interests morally matter to some degree for the entity’s own sake, such that it can be
wronged.”
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accordance with moral laws, it then follows that God acts in accordance with
moral laws regarding individuals with direct moral status. That’s just what (1)
claims, so (1) is true.
In defense of claim (2), the claim that sentient animals have direct moral
status, we argue that there is no morally relevant property that all sentient
humans possess that is not possessed by all sentient animals. If all sentient
humans have direct moral status, it follows that all sentient animals have
direct moral status. In the philosophical tradition, it has long been thought
that only humans have moral status on account of their having the cognitive
capacity for rationality, language, or self-awareness (or a combination there-
of). But this criterion of moral status is over- and under-inclusive, for some
animals possess rationality, language, or self-awareness (like other primates
and dolphins), and some humans do not possess these capacities (like infants
and some people with profound intellectual disabilities). If we want all and
only sentient humans to have moral status (and so no non-human animals) it
seems that we cannot capture this by appealing to specific human capacities.
In fact, no matter what property we choose (love, relationality, opposable
thumbs, etc.), there are some animals who have that property and there are
some sentient humans who lack that property. The only property that all and
only humans seem to have in common is their membership in the biological
category homo sapiens, and there is no good reason to think that a mere
biological category could be of moral relevance to moral status.14 If we want to
say, as many do, that all sentient humans have moral status, we should appeal
to a property that all sentient humans share, and one which is plausibly of
moral significance. We believe that the most plausible such candidate is
sentience. This is because your sentience appears to be necessary and sufficient
for things to matter to you. If you are not sentient, you are not a subject, and it
is also plausible to suppose that you do not have interests. If you are sentient,
then you can at least experience affective states like happiness and suffering.
For these reasons, we believe that sentience is necessary and sufficient for
moral status.15
14 Accepting the view that a mere biological category is morally relevant to moral status
comes with some significant problems. For a good overview of these problems, see Jaworska and
Tannenbaum (2013).
15 Some philosophers have argued that all or most animals do not have moral status on
account of their not being persons, or not being potential persons, or not having the natural
capacity for personhood. Arguing against all of these (and other) views would be an extremely
ambitious project for an entire chapter, let alone one small part of this chapter. So, due to space
limitations, we cannot discuss them here. Readers interested in these views should consult the
(vast) literature on the Problem of Non-Paradigm Humans. For further reading, see Singer
(1975); McMahan (2002, 2005); DeGrazia (1992, 2002, 2014). See also Kagan (2016). For a
Kantian case for the moral status of animals, see Korsgaard (2011). For a contractarian case see
Rowlands (2009).
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In reply, some may claim that moral status supervenes on a decidedly
theological property, namely “made in the image of God.” According to this
view, humans have moral status because they are made in the image of God
and animals do not have moral status because they are not made in the image
of God.
This view is problematic. In order to succeed it must make one of two
assumptions: either there is some morally relevant property or properties that
“made in the image of God” supervenes upon which make it the case that all
and only humans have moral status apart from God’s mere say-so, or there is
no such morally relevant property or properties and all and only humans have
moral status merely on account of God’s saying so. The former assumption
seems false, in light of our argument that there is no morally relevant property
that is possessed by all and only humans. On the other hand, the latter
assumption seems to make having moral status an objectionably arbitrary
matter. We assume that this view is false.16
But suppose this argument fails. Even so, it is extremely plausible to think
that sentient animals have direct moral status. Sentient animals are subjects
that can experience happiness and suffering in much the same way that
sentient humans do. Since we think that happiness and suffering have value
and disvalue for humans, there is strong reason to think they have value and
disvalue for animals. Moreover, the unjustified imposition of pain and suffer-
ing upon animals seems clearly morally wrong. For example, it seems clearly
morally wrong to kick a dog or mutilate a raccoon for no good reason.
Plausibly, this is so because the action harms or wrongs the animal in question
without adequate justification. But if this is true, then sentient animals must
have direct moral status.
If we accept that both (1) God acts in accordance with moral laws regarding
those creatures that have direct moral status, and (2) animals have direct
moral status, it follows that God acts in accordance with moral laws regarding
animals—laws requiring benefits to them and/or prohibiting harms against
them. While few of our other arguments rely upon this conclusion, it will
further support our thesis.
9 .2 . ARGUMENTS FROM DIVINE LOVE
Christians often claim that God is perfectly loving. Indeed, many Christians
claim that love is God’s most fundamental attribute. This latter, stronger claim
16 The charge of arbitrariness here mirrors the charge commonly pressed against divine
command theories. See, e.g., Idziak (2007: 298); Zagzebski (2005: 356–7); Baggett and Walls
(2011: 207–16); Louise (2009); and Sinnott-Armstrong (2009).
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is a plausible way of understanding the Christian scriptures and tradition, but
the prior, weaker claim is clearly supported by the Christian tradition. In our
arguments from divine love, we assume that the majority of Christians in the
faith tradition have been correct in claiming that God’s love is perfect.
One of the primary motivations for the claim that God is perfectly loving in
the Christian faith tradition is Anselmian perfect being theology.17 Ansel-
mians claim that God is by definition that being than which nothing greater
can be conceived. As Thomas Morris (1989: 70) claims, “God is thought of as
necessarily exemplifying a maximally compossible collection of great-making
properties, properties that, roughly, it is intrinsically better to have than to
lack. ” If any property p would make a divine being greater when that divine
being possesses p, that divine being must necessarily possess p. If, for example,
being maximally powerful is a great-making property, then divine beings are
necessarily maximally powerful, for that maximal power makes that divine
being greater than they would be if they were not maximally powerful.
Following this theological tradition, many claim that being maximally or
perfectly loving is a great-making property. Thus, any divine being is by
definition maximally or perfectly loving, for if that being were not maximally
or perfectly loving they would not have maximal great-making properties, and
therefore would not be deserving of the honorific title “God.” This is one
argument for God’s perfect love, and having the Anselmian foundation for
perfect divine love in the background will be useful for our analysis of the
nature of perfect love.18
Here is another argument for God’s perfect love. It seems very clear that
Christians want to insist that God is worthy of our worship and our total,
unreserved, wholehearted commitment. As Peterson et al. put it:
In developing our conception of God, it would be foolish to overlook the fact that,
above all, God is a being who is the object of worship. God’s “worshipability”…is of
primary religious importance, so that a conception of God that is lacking at this
point is unacceptable regardless of other merits it may possess. Whatever else may
be true of God, it must at least be said that God is worthy of worship. (2003: 60)19
There is good reason to think that Christians who want to maintain this view
would also want to say that God is perfectly loving. After all, a being that is
loving, but not perfectly loving, may be worthy of commendation, admiration,
17 Anselm, while not explicitly endorsing perfect love, claims that “all the ways of the Lord are
mercy” and that God’s mercy is “abundant” and flows from God’s “supreme goodness.” He also
claims that God is perfectly just, “for it is better to be just than unjust.” See Proslogion, chs 5, 9,
and 11.
18 It is worth pointing out that Christian Anselmians and non-Anselmians alike point to the
Christian scriptures to support the claim that God is perfectly loving. Some examples include 1
John 4:7–8,16–21; Ps 136:26; and Deut. 7:9.
19 Peterson et al., Reason and Religious Belief, 60.
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and respect, but it is not worthy of unconstrained, unbridled worship and
radical, thoroughgoing commitment. Given that God is worthy of worship, it
is quite reasonable to affirm that God is perfectly loving.20
In order to see what God’s perfect love implies about how God is or behaves,
we must first understand the nature of perfect love. Philosophers throughout
the Christian tradition have characterized love in general and divine love in
particular in various ways, but their different characterizations share com-
monalities. Consider the following characterizations of love put forward by
Christian theologians.
The proof of love is in the works. Where love exists, it works great things. But
when it ceases to act, it ceases to exist. (attributed to St. Gregory the Great)
I give you a new commandment: love one another: not as people who pretend
to love in order to corrupt one another, nor indeed as people love one another
genuinely but in a human way…They share with each other the love with which
he leads them to the end that will bring them fulfilment and the true satisfaction
of their real desires. For when God is all in all, there is no desire that is unfulfilled.
(Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, Tract 65:1)
An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and
to the person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is to wish that person
good. (Saint Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1 Q20 A1)
To tell someone to love his neighbor is, among other things, to tell him to care
about his neighbor’s welfare, and to give that neighbor’s welfare a fairly signifi-
cant place in his system of priorities. The commandment implies, then, behavior
which results, or can reasonably be expected to result, in improvements in the
welfare of others. (Howard-Snyder 1999: 391)
To tell someone to love his neighbor is, among other things, to tell him to care
about his neighbor’s welfare, and to give that neighbor’s welfare a fairly signifi-
cant place in his system of priorities. The commandment implies, then, behavior
which results, or can reasonably be expected to result, in improvements in the
welfare of others. (Smedes1983: 56)
God could be said to…love individual human persons in particular only if God
were good to each and every human person God created…. At a minimum, God’s
goodness to human individuals would require that God guarantee each a life that
was a great good to him/her on the whole. (Adams 1999: 31)
To love is to act intentionally, in sympathetic/empathetic response to others
(including God), to promote overall well-being. (Oord 2010: 15)
Necessarily, God loves a person S (with a perfect form of love) at a time t only if
God's intention at t and every moment subsequent to t is to do everything within
his power to promote the best interest of S. (Talbott 2013: 25)
All of these characterizations share in common the idea that love is focused on
making the beloved better-off. While we may mean many different things
20 It’s worth noting that, plausibly, Anselmian perfect-being theology is derivable from this
initial postulate that God is worthy of our worship. On this point, see Peterson et al. (2003: 60–1).
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when we claim to love something or someone, a concept of love that is central
to Christian theology implies that to love someone is, minimally, to pursue
their good or well-being. Therefore, for God to love an individual, God must
pursue that individual’s good or well-being.21
Perfect love, by contrast, is love that cannot be improved upon. If God is
perfectly loving, then God’s disposition must be fully and maximally loving, and
there must be nothing in God that is not loving. Thus, many have interpreted
God’s perfect love to be “maximally extended and equally intense” (Talbott
2013: 302).22 On the traditional, anthropocentric understanding of this claim,
this means that merely every individual human being is loved by God to an
equal and maximal degree. However, if God’s love is truly perfect, we should
expect God’s love to seek the maximal well-being of all of God’s creatures.
In defense of this claim, consider again the two bases offered in this section
for God’s perfect love, namely, an Anselmian conception of God and God’s
being worthy of worship. Both claim that God’s love ismaximal and cannot be
in any way improved upon. This also falls out of the very nature of perfection,
which is to be free of any flaws or unsurpassable. Now consider two all-
powerful beings, Jack and Jill. Jill loves all sentient individuals. She cares
deeply for their sakes, and is perfectly benevolent toward sentient individuals
both human and non-human, doing whatever she can to make them better-
off. On the other hand, Jack loves only humans. He cares deeply for their
sakes, and is perfectly benevolent toward humans, doing whatever he can to
make them better-off. However, Jack does not care at all about what happens
to animals. He is utterly indifferent to them. Jack never responds to their calls
for help, and does not care if they are made worse-off, even though he could
easily benefit them without sacrificing anything at all. When we reflect on Jill
and Jack, we find that one is more loving than the other. Jill’s love appears to
be an improvement upon Jack’slove; Jill has a better love than Jack. What this
tells us is that perfect love is universal. Perfect love is omni-sympathetic,
sympathizing with and aiding any individual who has a “sake” that matters
to them—any individual who can be subjectively better or worse-off. Far from
being perfectly loving, Jack’s indifference toward animal welfare appears
strongly perverse. This is evidence that animal suffering is an appropriate
object of care and consideration—in a word, love. Since God’s character—far
from being perverse—is perfectly loving, God loves animals, desiring to
promote their well-being.
So far, this is compatible with an understanding of divine love whereby God
loves animals, but only modestly. But consider another pair of all-powerful
beings, Jeremy and Jemima. Jeremy cares about others. Jeremy wants to benefit
21 What we say here does not commit us to what Bennett Helm (2013) calls “the robust
concern view of love.” We take no stand here on whether that view is true.
22 See also Jeff Jordan’s (2012) originating article in which he argues against this view.
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others and prevent their suffering. However, Jeremy’s love is of a satisficing sort.
That is, Jeremy only cares about getting others to a certain welfare threshold. As
long as others are not suffering, Jeremy is indifferent toward their wants and
desires. Jeremy does not make others flourish, even though he could easily do so
without sacrificing anything at all. Jeremymerely wants to ensure that others are
not badly off. Jemima also cares about others, wanting to benefit them and
prevent their suffering. However, unlike Jeremy, Jemima’s love is of a maximiz-
ing sort. She is concerned about more than whether others suffer. She desires
and sees to it that others flourish. When others are well-off, Jemima desires that
they be better-off still, and further promotes their flourishing. When we reflect
on Jeremy and Jemima, we find that one is more loving than the other. Jemima’s
love is an improvement upon Jeremy’s love; she has a better love than he. What
this tells us is that perfect love ismaximizing. Perfect love is never satisfied with
what is good, but is always aimed at what is best. If God’s love is perfect, then
God wants the best for each creature whom God loves. God’s perfect love is
universal and maximizing; therefore God desires and aims to promote the
maximal well-being of each individual creature.
From this discussion of perfect love, we can see that God’s perfect love
entails Animal Universalism. We have argued that God’s love is universal and
is maximizing, and therefore that God desires that every individual creature be
maximally well-off. For an individual to be maximally well-off, that individual
must have as long and as high-quality a life as possible. Of course, the longest
and highest-quality of life an individual can live is a life that includes a never-
ending tenure in heaven.23 So, God desires that every individual creature live a
life that includes a never-ending tenure in heaven. Compared to an everlast-
ing, maximally good life, a life that ends in permanent death is not very good
at all. Death marks the end of all of our projects, our relationships, and our
happiness, and being alive is a prerequisite for having any well-being. God’s
perfect love implies that God does not desire that any creature suffer perman-
ent death, and will keep all animals in God’s company forever.
One might object, arguing that this seems to imply a stronger form of univer-
salism than we are seeking to defend here: namely, that all animals including
humans will inherit heaven.24 But Animal Universalism does not all by itself
entail soteriological universalism for humanity.We have argued that God aims to
maximize the well-being of each individual creature. Many Christians accept the
claim that God desires that all humans be saved (which seems supported by
1 Tim.2:1-4, 2 Pet. 3:9, and Ezk. 18:23), but nonetheless claim that it is not a defect
23 We are aware of the worries some philosophers have raised about the alleged “tedium of
immortality.”We do not think that immortality will be tedious for any individual, much less for
animals, many of whom likely lack the advanced, future- and past-oriented cognitive capacities
required for overall life boredom. Of course, we cannot fully address these worries in this
chapter.
24 For a brief discussion of whether this also motivates “plant universalism,” see footnote 40.
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in God’s love for God to allow some humans to be excluded from heaven in light
of their free choice not to enter heaven or because of their sinfulness. If human
free will or human sinfulness can do the work that some claim it can do, showing
that it is not a strike against God’s love for God to dismiss some humans from
heaven, then our arguments do not entail human universalism.25
On the other hand, animals are innocent. No animals (that we know of)
have a capacity for propositional moral agency. They cannot rationally reflect
on what actions they will perform and therefore cannot be held morally
responsible for causing harms. Some political theorists, like Sue Donaldson
and Will Kymlicka (2011: 116–17), have argued that animals do have some
capacity for moral agency—they can cooperate according to the terms of
certain games in their own societies and in trans-species civil societies like
ours. Whether that is true or not, it is unlikely that this kind of moral agency is
sufficiently robust to ground blameworthiness. Animals are capable of follow-
ing certain perceptual norms, but are not capable of reflecting on and making
judgments about these norms, deciding what kinds of persons they want to be
and intentionally cultivating certain virtues. They are therefore no more
blameworthy from the moral point of view for their non-cooperation than
uncooperative infants who will not eat their food.26
Onemight argue that their limited capacity formoral agencymay nonetheless
exclude certain animals from heaven. If animals are incapable of cooperating
with the rules of heavenly society, they cannot take part in heavenly life. But there
are good replies available to this objection. Surely, just as God can and will help
many unruly and otherwise uncooperative humans to become suitable citizens of
heaven, God can and will help animals to live a peaceful and otherwise coopera-
tive life in heavenly society. Moreover, few contemporary theologians think that
profoundly intellectually disabled humans or human infants will be dismissed
from heaven because they were uncooperative in this life, so there is no reason to
think that animals with similar intellectual abilities will be.27
The case of profoundly intellectually disabled humans and young human
children also informs what we should say about the capacity for animals to
25 Due to space constraints, we will not attempt to argue for the antecedent here. But it is
worth noting that this objection would almost surely come from those who are inclined against
soteriological universalism for humanity, and it seems clear that they would argue forcefully for
the antecedent. Of course, this does not show that the antecedent is true; rather, this is merely a
comment on the nature of the dialectical exchange.
26 Should it turn out that some animals do have robust, propositional moral agency, these
animals may be subject to further requirements in order to enter and remain in Heaven
(plausibly, these would be whatever requirements typical human moral agents must meet). In
such a case, our arguments here (insofar as they depend on the assumption that animals are not
robust moral agents) would establish something slightly weaker than Animal Universalism (e.g.,
non-primate animal universalism).
27 For a reply to an objection along this line from Swinburne, see The Nature of Heaven
Objection in Section 9.4 of this chapter.
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freely reject life in heaven. Many people believe that those who die with limited
rational capacities are automatic candidates for a life in heaven.28 If this is
correct, then we should also think the same thing about animals, who all have
similarly limited rational capacities.
However, moving from limited rational capacities to guaranteed entry into
heaven might be too quick. Disability scholars frequently argue that we must
respect the agency of people with disabilities by using a model of shared
agency through which surrogates take the preferences, desires, and goals of
people with disabilities and empower these people to make fully-informed
decisions that align with their subjective interests.29 Thus, where the prefer-
ences and values of those with limited intellectual abilities can be elicited, we
have good reason to respect those preferences and values.
We are sympathetic with the claims of disability scholars that there is little if
any reason to be uniquely paternalistic toward humans with disabilities and
animals, but this does not cause problems for our thesis. For no animals—with
the possible exceptions of some non-human primates and cetaceans—have the
capacities for becoming sufficiently competent with the concepts of life and
death, existence and nonexistence, or heaven to be able to make informed
choices about their eternal fates. Moreover, most animals lack even the most
basic capacities of practical reason necessary to make autonomous decisions. It
is therefore not possible for God to give animals autonomy to make their own
decisions about whether to enter heaven. More appropriately, God should take
into account whether and to what degree animals will value their rich future
heavenly lives if they are brought into heaven, and should take their prefer-
ences into consideration when constructing the heavenly city. When it comes
to matters of existence and nonexistence, however, animals are simply incap-
able of making an autonomous decision that God is required to respect.30
From all of this, it follows that God will be compelled by perfect love to
usher all animals into heaven. In addition to this, consider a second argument
from divine love for Animal Universalism.
In several places, Thomas Talbott wonders how the Blessed can experience
joy in heaven if friends and loved ones are in hell. He claims that they can’t. As
he writes:
I could never be happy, for example, knowing that my daughter is suffering or in
a miserable condition—unless, of course, I could somehow believe that all will
be well for her in the end. But if I cannot believe this, if I were to believe instead
28 According to Walls (2002), “it is striking that there is a broad consensus today that all who
die in infancy are saved.”
29 See, for example, Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011: 103–8).
30 Against this, some have raised the possibility that God will enable animals to understand
the facts relevant to their decision and become capable of practical reasoning. We argue that this
view fails in our discussion of The Agency Objection in Section 9.4.
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that she had been lost to me forever…my own happiness could never be
complete. (n.d.)31
Given that the Christian tradition has historically claimed that in heaven each
citizen’s joy is complete—there is no suffering and no tears—Talbott argues
that for God to make good on God’s promises God would have to save all
humans.32 All of us have such deeply intertwined interests; God could not
even save one human, Talbott claims, without saving all humans.
Talbott’s claims are understandably quite contentious and, while powerful,
there may be reason to be skeptical of them. For one, it is by no means clear
that all humans have such powerfully intertwined interests that God could not
save even one human without saving them all. For example, it seems clear that
there may be some severely neglected orphans or people with attachment
disorders that could be perfectly happy without God bringing anyone else to
heaven along with them. Moreover, it seems perfectly clear that God could
bring certain remote tribes into heaven—people groups that never made
meaningful contact with outsiders—without bringing everyone else in the
world into heaven. It may be reasonable to suppose that such people would
not experience compromised joy in heaven if some people outside of their
tribe were damned or annihilated altogether.
Of course, this kind of a response is unlikely to satisfy the conservative
Christian theist, who will surely want to see a defense of a more traditional
exclusivist view of heaven. But perhaps there are responses available to
conservative theists that undermine Talbott’s argument. William Lane Craig
(1991), for one, argues that it may not be immoral for God to deceive the
Blessed, shielding them from the knowledge that those they love are damned.
Furthermore, if the lost freely choose not to enter heaven and if God respects
human freedom, it may just be that it is all-things-considered best if God does
what is otherwise unfortunate and keeps the ultimate fate of the lost from the
Blessed.
These are just examples of approaches that conservative Christian theists
might take to resolve the problems Talbott has proposed. We take no stand
here on whether those approaches ultimately succeed. It seems fairly clear that
God’s love for the Blessed and desire that they flourish maximally gives God a
reason to rescue the lost and usher them into heaven, but it is arguable that
God has overriding reasons not to rescue them (e.g., human freedom or
sinfulness), and thus that it is, all things considered, most reasonable for
31 See also Talbott (1990). Perhaps it’s worth noting that Stephen T. Davis regards this
universalist argument to be one of the five best arguments for universalism he can think of.
He writes: “How can the Blessed be joyous if friends and loved ones are in hell? I do not know an
adequate answer to this question” (2011: 105).
32 For a defense of the view that negative emotions are compatible with eternal existence in
Heaven, see Pelser (2017).
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God to allow some humans to be damned or annihilated. The parallel case
for Animal Universalism from relational love, however, is much less easily
avoided.
Just as in Talbott’s case for human universalism from relational love, those
who have relationships with particular animals care about the wellbeing of
these animals, and would be adversely affected by the knowledge that they
have permanently lost their lives. Thus, those humans in heaven who had
meaningful relationships with animals during their mortal lives could not
flourish maximally while knowing that their animal companions had been lost
forever. Each of these animals, in turn, would flourish maximally only if they
were able to live in heaven with their non-human families, and with those
other animals that they had relationships with prior to their deaths. Humans
in heaven would be better-off if all of their animal companions lived alongside
them, flourishing maximally, and would therefore be better-off if all of their
animal companions’ non-human friends and families were ushered into
heaven—along with their respective friends and families, and so on—for
eternity as well. Finally, as we argued earlier, each individual animal matters
to God. God loves each individual animal, and the loss of these animals would
be a great relational loss to God, who looks after each animal and desires their
well-being and their companionship.
This profound web of interconnectivity—of God and humans to their
animal friends and these animal friends to their own friends, and so forth—
gives God strong reason to welcome all animals into heaven. Doing so would
satisfy God’s desires and would further promote the wellbeing of each human
in heaven.33 Unlike in the human case, however, God could have no overrid-
ing reasons not to include each animal in heaven. As we have argued, animals
cannot refuse heaven on the basis of their free choice, and they cannot be
refused entry on account of their sinfulness. Where animals are concerned,
God’s choice is simple. God can easily prevent the loss of meaningful rela-
tionships without sacrificing anything of moral importance, and God will
therefore be compelled by perfect love to do so. It follows that God will ensure
the universal salvation of all animals.
9 .3 . ARGUMENTS FROM DIVINE JUSTICE
Many Christians and classical theists claim that God is perfectly just. They
may accept this claim on Anselmian grounds or on the basis of biblical
passages such as Deuteronomy 32:4, which states that “all of [God’s] ways
33 C. S. Lewis seems to endorse a similar argument in Lewis (1962: 140).
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are just.”34 This seems to imply, minimally, that God never acts in ways that
are unjust. The claim that God is perfectly just is also plausibly entailed if, as
we have argued, God has moral obligations and never fails to act upon these
obligations. For among these obligations are, plausibly, duties of justice, or
fairness. We argue that it would be unjust for God to provide human beings
with the opportunity to enter heaven while withholding the same opportunity
from animals. Because God never acts unjustly, it follows that God will offer
animals the opportunity to enter heaven.35 This furnishes strong support for
Animal Universalism.
Our basic argument from justice concerns moral arbitrariness with respect
to an opportunity to enter heaven. Suppose that two human beings, Antonio
and Amanda, differ only with respect to their eternal fates and their sexes:
Amanda is female and her eternal fate is bad; Antonio is male and his eternal
fate is good. Suppose also that this is the direct result of God’s decision to
extend a certain opportunity to Antonio but not to Amanda, and God did this
in order to preserve males but not females. This would be an injustice since
there is no morally important difference between Antonio and Amanda.36
Similarly, it would be unjust (for example) for a specified ethnicity, birthplace,
or intellectual ability to be required for entrance into heaven, because such
properties are altogether morally irrelevant. Where properties are morally
irrelevant, it is unjust to use those properties as criteria for whether or
which individuals come to suffer significant harm. If God condemns all
South Americans to eternal suffering or nonexistence on account of their
birthplace, then God treats South Americans unjustly.
Similarly, it would be unjust to deprive someone of an equal opportunity to
enter and remain within heaven on account of their species.37 To see why,
consider an alien race identical with human beings except with respect to
where they originated: Mars, not Earth. These Martians share human subject-
ive awareness, sentience, and other psycho-physical features.38 They, too,
34 See also: Psalm 9:7–8 and 36:6, Isaiah 30:18 and 61:8, Job 34:12, and 2 Chronicles 19:7.
35 Jerry Walls endorses the view that God would give animals an equal opportunity to enter
Heaven. See Walls (2002: 85).
36 One might object that God is under no obligation to extend to anyone the opportunity to
enter and remain within Heaven, and so there is no injustice done in this case if God withholds
opportunity for salvation from Amanda on the basis of sex alone. In brief, one might reply by
arguing that even if God is not obligated to offer anyone an opportunity for salvation, perfect
love compels God to offer such opportunities anyway (as an act of supererogation) while perfect
justice compels God to offer non-arbitrarily distributed opportunities.
37 The argument succeeds even if God does not provide animals with an equal opportunity. It
remains a requirement of justice that God not deprive animals of an opportunity altogether,
which entails that God will give them some genuine opportunity. Moreover, as we argue in this
section and Section 9.4, animals will not reject this opportunity.
38 It might be objected that direct moral status is fixed by personhood and that only certain
species (e.g., humans) or cognitive classes (e.g., agents) have personhood. As argued previously,
however, sentience is sufficient for direct moral status. Thus, in the context of general moral
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would be harmed by death (including everlasting death) and everlasting
existence in a bad state.39 Plausibly, in such a case, it would be wrong to
exclude Martians from the possibility of heaven merely on account of their
species. But then it would be similarly wrong to do the same to animals.40
Consider a similar argument made by Jeff McMahan (2002), which begins
with a discussion of a hypothetical experiment:
If it is possible to insert a single human gene into an animal zygote, it should be
possible to insert two or more. We can imagine a spectrum of possibilities. At one
end of the spectrum, there is a transgenic animal—say, a chimpanzee—with a
single human gene…. Next in the spectrum there is a transgenic chimpanzee with
two human genes. And so on, with each animal farther along in the spectrum
having one more human gene than the animal before it. Since the overlap
between the human and the chimpanzee genomes is high, it may be well beyond
the middle range of the imagined spectrum before one reaches individuals that
are phenotypically chimerical: individuals that are half-human, half-chimpanzee,
with bizarre blends of human and chimpanzee characteristics. At the far end of
the spectrum is an individual grown from a chimpanzee zygote from which all of
the chimpanzee genes but one have been removed and replaced by human genes.
This would, presumably, be a human being with a single chimpanzee gene. (213)
McMahan then inquires,
Is there a point along this spectrum at which the individuals cease to be chim-
panzees and become human beings? Is there, in other words, a point at which
there is an individual with just enough human genetic material to count as a
member of our species? And, if so, is it only at that point that there begin to be
individuals with special moral status—for example, individuals whose lives are
sacred and inviolable? (213)
He concludes that the answer is “no”:
I suspect that the chimeras near the middle of the spectrum would be neither
human beings nor chimpanzees. On either side of these would be individuals
whose species membership would be genuinely indeterminate. But these issues,
though interesting, need not detain us here. The important point is that it would
be absurd to suppose that the moral status of any individual in the spectrum
consideration, discriminating between sentient groups on account of species is objectionably
arbitrary. See Section 9.1, “Divine Duties to Animals.”
39 This should not be interpreted as a tautology. By “bad state,” we simply mean a state the
features of which would suffice to make existence in that state bad for their otherwise identical
human counterparts.
40 What of non-sentient entities like plants? Plausibly, all non-sentient entities lack direct
moral status and are therefore not proper recipients of direct concerns of justice, such as intrinsic
moral consideration. It is also noteworthy that plants do not have a “sake” that matters to them,
and therefore are not proper objects of divine love. While the flourishing of animals matters to
those animals themselves, and thus matters to an omni-sympathetic God, the flourishing of
plants matters to no one except for, possibly, third-party observers that like plants.
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would be determined by how many, or what proportion, of its genes were human
or were taken from a human being. (213)
Here, it appears that mere membership in a species is insufficient to ground
any special moral status. Let us stipulate that an animal with n number of
human genetic characteristics is human, and that an animal with n-minus-1
number of human genetic characteristics is non-human.
Consider now two of the animals in the genetic line-up: Cigar, who has n
number of human genetic characteristics, and Nocigar, who has n-minus-1
number of human genetic characteristics. Per stipulation, Cigar is human and
Nocigar is non-human. Let us also suppose—following those who hold that
mere species membership is both necessary and sufficient for special moral
status—that Cigar has the necessary kind of moral status which obligates God
to provide an opportunity for Cigar to enter and remain within heaven, and
that Nocigar lacks that moral status and, with it, any hope of obligating God to
provide Nocigar with the same opportunity. What should be clear is that the
difference between Cigar and Nocigar is far too small to justify such vastly
different treatments. As Ted Sider remarks, “[T]here will be someone who just
barely made it, and someone else who just barely missed out. This is
impossible, given the proportionality of justice” (2002: 60). He continues:
What I am calling the proportionality of justice prohibits very unequal treatment
of persons who are very similar in relevant respects. Whatever one thinks generally
about the nature of justice, its proportionality should be acknowledged. (59)
Cigar and Nocigar differ with respect to only one genetic characteristic.
A basic requirement of justice is that individuals who are radically and
relevantly similar not be treated as if they were radically and relevantly
different, and thus Cigar and Nocigar should not receive intensely different
treatments with respect to their eternal destinies.41 Such a conclusion justifies
the more general principle that membership in a species cannot alone justify a
special kind of moral status (or moral status simpliciter) because, if it did, it
would justify vastly different treatments for individuals like Cigar and Noci-
gar, which is unjust.42 We look now to further support for the claim that mere
species does not grant special moral status.
41 This is true even if it is compatible with the demands of justice to treat them somewhat
differently.
42 Sider’s argument arguably supports a broader universalism than we defend here. Never-
theless, our arguments do not entail broader universalism. For criticism of Sider’s arguments as
they apply to broader universalism, see, for example, Dougherty and Poston (2008). See also
Corabi (2011), which develops an account on which mortal sins are a non-arbitrary basis for
cutoffs in a binary afterlife. Corabi’s account is significant since it would, were it correct, provide
grounds to deny a broader universalism while affirming Animal Universalism, since it might be
that some human beings but no animals commit mortal sins.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 28/10/2016, SPi
In Defense of Animal Universalism 177
Comp. by: Jaganathan Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0002887558 Date:28/10/16 Time:17:00:44
Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002887558.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 178
Mark Rowlands (1997) has offered a contractarian account of how animals
come to have direct moral status in virtue of which there are duties of justice
concerning animals.43 He begins by explaining Rawls’s claim about properties
which are bracketed behind the veil of ignorance:
[I]f a property is undeserved in the sense that its possessor has done nothing to
merit its possession, then its possessor is not morally entitled to whatever benefits
accrue from that possession. Possession of the property is a morally arbitrary
matter, and, therefore, cannot be used to determine the moral entitlements of its
possessor. (238–9)
Examples of such properties include ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, and
one’s economic status at birth. It applies also, Rowlands claims, to properties
like rationality: a property which animals often lack and, because they lack it
(or because they lack it to a sufficient degree), they also lack direct moral
status:
However, rationality seems to be an undeserved property if any property is.
A person plays no role in deciding whether or not she is going to be rational;
she either is or she is not. The decision is not hers, but nature’s. Therefore,
according to the terms of the intuitive equality argument, it is a morally arbitrary
property, and one is not morally entitled to its possession. Therefore, also, one is
not morally entitled to whatever benefits accrue from its possession. (242)
That humans are rational (or that humans are rational in a certain way or to a
certain degree) is an undeserved property. If God denies animals a chance to
enter and remain within heaven on the grounds that they lack rationality (or
lack it as humans have it), then God discriminates on unjust grounds. Such a
decision is comparable to a case where God permits a human person of
average intelligence to enter heaven but does not so permit a human person
of below-average intelligence on grounds of the intelligence differential. We
would condemn such a decision, but then we should condemn the criterion
which, if used consistently, would permit the injustice.
We can extend this argument to other properties. One’s species is, like one’s
intelligence, a matter not under one’s control.44 Having intelligence is, to use
Rowland’s phrase, not a decision of ours, but of nature’s. We do nothing to
merit our intelligence or the species which bestows it, but then any benefits
which accrue from our intelligence or our species, like any benefits which
accrue from our ethnicity or sex, are undeserved and arbitrary. Therefore, to
deny animals entrance to heaven on account of their species would be to deny
43 See also Rowlands (2009: 118–75).
44 Should scientific progress introduce the possibility of changing one’s species, it would
nevertheless be true that one could not determine one’s initial species. Everything is something
or other from the moment of its existence, and the possibility of actually choosing one’s species at
a given time is therefore impossible without also being a particular species at that given time.
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them an opportunity on the basis of a morally arbitrary property. Any
criterion which grounds denial of opportunities to others on morally arbitrary
grounds is unjust.
The justice argument for Animal Universalism, however, need not depend
on a contractarian understanding of fairness. It is sufficient to show that
animals have the minimal outfitting necessary to experience various possible
afterlives, since it is hard to see how more than that can matter to motivate an
obligatory equal opportunity to have (basic) access to heaven.
Because animals are sentient, they are capable of being made better-off or
worse-off by their eternal state.45 That is, thingswould go better for animals if they
lived in a good, eternal state than if they did not do so. This is because animals are,
to use Regan’s terminology, “subjects-of-a-life.” Speaking of the children of
Willowbrook, who endured horrific experimentation justified on the grounds
that they were (like animals) sufficiently unintelligent, Regan (2014) writes:
[A]s important as these differences are, they should not obscure the similarities.
For, like us, these children were the subjects-of-a-life, their life, a life that was
experientially better or worse for the child whose life it was…. True, they lacked
the ability to read and to make moral choices; nevertheless, what was done to
these children—both what they experienced and what they were deprived of—
mattered to them as the individuals they were, just as surely as what is done to us,
when we are harmed, matters to us. (101)
We need not join Regan in supposing that being a subject-of-a-life entails
rights, but we should concede that this fact about animal psychology commits
us to the view that animal afterlives ought to receive moral consideration
comparable to what human afterlives receive. The explanation why is simple
enough: being eternally dead and being eternally badly off are unfavorable
outcomes for both humans and animals. As Peter Singer (1986) points out,
There are important differences between humans and other animals, and these
differences must give rise to some differences, in the rights that each has.
Recognizing this obvious fact, however, is no barrier to the case for extending
the basic principle of equality to non-human animals…. Many feminists hold that
women have the right to an abortion on request. It does not follow that since
these same people are campaigning for equality between men and women they
must support the right of men to have abortions too. Since a man cannot have an
abortion, it is meaningless to talk of his right to have one. Since a pig can’t vote, it
is meaningless to talk of its right to vote. (217)
45 It might be objected that sentience alone is inadequate outfitting to enjoy the goods of
Heaven. Walls (2002) claims that Heaven, if it is the Beatific Vision only, would not be the sort of
good that mere sentient beings could appreciate. Richard Swinburne appears to endorse a view of
Heaven wherein the inhabitants of Heaven are those who go about the business of Heaven, the
business being such that it requires moral agency. See Swinburne (1989: 190, 195). We consider
these objections in Section 9.4, The Nature of Heaven.
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The passage is instructive. Animals, like human beings, can take pleasure in
heaven. They can also be harmed by eternal death and by eternal existence in a
bad state. Whereas differences may exist between humans and animals, here
there is commonality. This is true even if human beings have an enhanced
capacity to benefit or be harmed by the possible afterlife states.
Denying opportunities to others is not always unjust, because they might be
denied the opportunity on morally non-arbitrary grounds. Consider a pro-
spective college student, Kay, who applied to Yale but was rejected as a direct
result of there being better-qualified applicants and limited space for incoming
students. Here the basis of Kay’s rejection is non-arbitrary, and thus the fact
that she lacks a particular opportunity is the result of applying non-arbitrary
criteria. Conversely, if Kay were rejected on account of being (for example)
transgender or Native American, such a rejection would be entirely arbitrary
and consequently unjust. That animals are not members of our species is
entirely morally irrelevant here. What matters is that they can suffer and that
their lives will be better or worse depending on their eternal state.
At this point, it might be useful to summarize our basic argument from
justice. There is no morally relevant property that distinguishes animals from
human beings with respect to whether it is good to have an opportunity to
enter and remain within heaven. But if there is no morally relevant property
that distinguishes animals from human beings with respect to whether it is
good to have an opportunity to enter and remain within heaven, then if
human beings are offered an opportunity to enter and remain within heaven,
then it is a requirement of justice that animals be given an opportunity to enter
and remain within heaven. Human beings are offered an opportunity to enter
and remain within heaven. Therefore, it is a requirement of justice that
animals be given an opportunity to enter and remain within heaven.
The argument offers strong support for Animal Universalism. If the argu-
ment is sound, then each individual animal will be offered an opportunity to
enter and remain in heaven. Because each individual animal likes to be in
heaven, and because none of them have the intellectual ability to reflect ration-
ally on the nature of heaven and decide that they do not want to be there, if God
presents each animal with an opportunity to enter and remain within the
bounds of the heavenly city, they will certainly do so. Moreover, when parents
who have children without the intellectual ability to reflect on their own good
must make a choice on behalf of their children, they have a pro tanto obligation
to choose the option that favors the child’s maximal well-being. Similarly, if God
must make soteriological decisions on behalf of animals because they lack the
ability to reflect on their own good, God, being perfectly loving and just, will
infallibly opt for their entrance into heaven.
This argument does not exhaust considerations from justice which favor
Animal Universalism. While we will not explicate and defend every relevant
argument from justice, we offer one more which further supports Animal
Universalism.
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The Right to Avoid Harm.46 Animals are harmed when their basic creaturely
desires are frustrated, setback, or defeated.47 Starvation, disease, injury, fear,
stress, anxiety, isolation, and boredom count as just some of the ways their
basic creaturely desires are frustrated, setback, or defeated. Animals aim to
avoid harm by seeking shelter, fleeing attackers, avoiding dangerous natural
conditions, and the like. Just as it would be a violation of an animal’s right to
avoid harm to deny that animal the opportunity to flee from attackers or seek
shelter from a lightning storm, so also it would be wrong to deny an animal the
opportunity to avoid eternal nonexistence or an eternally bad existence. Quite
clearly, both eternal nonexistence and entering into an eternally bad state
mark the end of any possibility for future desire satisfaction, and counts as the
ultimate and final frustration of the animal’s basic desires. These are serious
harms indeed.
Offering them such an opportunity, while not requiring one to secure a safe
outcome, would nevertheless require one to “open the gates” to heaven to make
room for the possibility that the animal will walk through it. An animal’s chance
to exercise some measure of control over her wellbeing, therefore, depends (at
least with respect to its eternal state)48 on her opportunity to enter heaven. For
this possibility to be realized, it must be the case that God grants to animals the
opportunity to enter and remain within heaven.49 As before, it remains im-
plausible that animals would reject such an opportunity. All animals will,
therefore, be offered an opportunity to enter and remain within heaven, will
not reject that opportunity, and will therefore remain within heaven forever.
9 .4 . OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED
While animals have not received much sustained attention in theological and
philosophical literature on soteriology and heaven, a few arguments have been
raised against God’s inclusion of animals in heaven. We consider them here.
46 Here we have in mind what Tom Beauchamp (2011) calls rights to nonmaleficent
treatment.
47 The particular details regarding the nature of any animal’s basic desires depend upon the
contingent psychology of the particular animal, e.g., how well-developed, robust, and sophisti-
cated the mind of the individual animal happens to be.
48 Animals often have pre-afterlife opportunities to exercise some control over their well-
being.
49 Due to the cognitive limitations of most animals, it is implausible to think that they might
somehow on their own gain awareness of the opportunity to enter Heaven, or that they even have
the cognitive capacity to assent to an opportunity to enter Heaven. Consider a shepherd who
desires to give his flock the chance to appreciate a greener valley but, due to the cognitive
limitations of the flock, cannot convey to them the nature of the greener valley. In such a case, it
appears the best and perhaps only way to give the flock an opportunity to enter the valley is by
taking them there and permitting them to decide whether to stay.
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The Survival Objection. Some lay theologians have argued that animals will
not enter heaven because they cannot survive their deaths. This is said to be on
account of their not having souls. Our response is twofold. First, the extensive
psychological and biological similarity between humans and animals,50 as well
as the details of our species’ own evolutionary origins, does not support such a
stark metaphysical divide between humans and animals.51 Second, if God is
required (morally or due to God’s own nature) to bring animals into heaven,
God cannot satisfy this requirement or avoid its normative force simply by
programming animals to go out of existence at their biological deaths.52 Such
an act would be wrong or irrational insomuch as it constitutes God’s effect-
ively sabotaging God’s own moral pursuits or undermining God’s own
nature.53
The Nature of Heaven Objection. Further, more sophisticated arguments are
considered by Richard Swinburne and Jerry Walls. Swinburne (1989) argues
that some human beings will not enter (or, if they enter for a time, will not
eternally remain within) heaven since they will not be about the business of
heaven, which includes worshiping God and interceding for the saints.
Since the happiness of Heaven can only be had by those who desire to pursue the
occupations of Heaven, the life of Heaven can only be enjoyed by saints. For they
alone would have the right desires. If there is a place where those and only those
who live that life are located (as I am assuming for simplicity of exposition) what
is crucial about being in Heaven is not being in that place but living in circum-
stances where the ideal desires which I have described achieve their fulfilment in
the ways I have described. (190)
In the same vein, Eleonore Stump (1985) explains the predicament of those
who are damned to hell:
It seems reasonable to suppose and it is traditional Christian doctrine, that God
always wills the good for its own sake. So to will in accordance with God’s will, a
man must also will the good for its own sake. The assumption behind [certain
objections to hell] is that anyone who has once had a taste of hell would
50 As suggested in the context of the main argument from justice in Section 9.3.
51 See also the arguments for animal souls in Dougherty (2014: 155–66).
52 Swinburne (1989: 196) considers the possibility that human babies who die in infancy will
be annihilated since they are not properly retrofitted for Heaven. A similar possibility arises with
animals—perhaps animals are annihilated due to their being improperly retrofitted for Heaven.
However, what goes for indirect divine action like biological programming for mortality also
extends to direct divine action like annihilation. Moreover, such an objection simply asserts that
our defense of Animal Universalism fails without giving any reasons for thinking it fails.
53 Michael Murray (2008: 122–9) explicitly follows KeithWard (1982: 201–2) in claiming that
God’s goodness would be undermined if animals harmed during their earthly lives were not
compensated with eternal existence in the divine presence. If this is true, it offers further evidence
against the Survival Objection (though only partial, since it might be empirically true that not all
animals were harmed in their earthly lives, and therefore divine goodness does not require
ushering those animals into Heaven forever).
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henceforth do whatever he had to do to avoid hell. But then such a person would
be willing the good not for its own sake but for the sake of avoiding hell. Such a
person’s will would thus not be in conformity with God’s will, and so it would not
be possible for God to bring it about that such a person participate in the union
with God which is essential to life in heaven. (402)
Central to this view is a picture in which moral agents whose wills are oriented
toward the good belong in a place uniquely suited to their natures. Because the
business of Swinburne’s heaven requires propositional agency, which presum-
ably at least some animals lack, Swinburne’s argument indirectly criticizes
Animal Universalism. Similarly, Walls (2002) considers but does not endorse
the view that heaven might be nothing more than an eternal beatific vision,
thereby excluding individuals who are not propositional agents, and so
excluding at least animals.54
However, recent claims in disability scholarship imply that excluding animals
and people with intellectual disabilities on account of their not being propos-
itional agents is at odds with God’s perfect justice. Disability rights activists
frequently argue that it is unjust to construct society so that it excludes certain
people from full participation only on account of their lacking certain capabil-
ities.55 For example, it is unjust to intentionally install staircases on public
buildings instead of installing ramps if some members of society rely on
wheelchairs for their mobility. Similarly, if God were to intentionally construct,
structure, or otherwise arrange heavenly society so that it excludes humans and
animals who lack the capability to reflect on moral propositions, God would
thereby unilaterally bring about a paradigmatically unjust and disablist society.
Furthermore, philosophers of children’s rights and disability rights fre-
quently argue that it is a requirement of justice to aid others in social
development so that they are not disadvantaged when they enter civil soci-
ety.56 This implies that a perfectly just God would aid animals, children, and
people with intellectual disabilities so that they can participate in the heavenly
community inasmuch as is possible given their intellectual capacities. While
we do not have the space to explore these claims further, we think they are
precisely right. Surely an infinitely resourceful, perfectly just and perfectly
loving God would not construct a fundamentally unjust, disablist society and
fail to aid those God loves in fitting in entering into the life of the community.
Surely God can find a way to recognize a whole world of creaturely difference
in God’s own society.57
54 He writes, “If heaven is the beatific vision exclusively, then there may be no meaningful
place for animals in heaven” (91).
55 See, e.g., Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011: 103–22); Wasserman (1998); Calder (2010); and
Fraser (2007).
56 See, e.g., Eekelaar (1986).
57 A related objection is that children and individuals with intellectual disabilities might be
sent to Limbo (or someplace distinct from Heaven) on the grounds that they cannot adequately
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Moreover, because (as we have argued) God loves animals and wants them
to flourish, it would be strictly irrational for God to design heaven so that its
nature requires God to annihilate animals.58 God’s perfect love will compel
God to design heaven for the maximal inclusion and flourishing of animals.
The Agency Objection. A further objection may be derived from the follow-
ing. Perhaps God will reincarnate cognitively underdeveloped individuals and,
in Swinburne’s words, “allow them there the choice of destiny of which they
were deprived on this earth” (1989: 195). Trent Dougherty (2014) contends
that something like this will occur in the case of animals, though nowhere does
he mention reincarnation.59 The presumed divinely intended effects, however,
would be the same, since animals would have their cognitive abilities enhanced
to the extent that God would, to use Swinburne’s words, “allow them there the
choice of destiny.” In Dougherty’s own words:
[A]nimals…will not only be resurrected at the eschaton, but will be deified in
much the same way that humans will be. That they will become, in the language
of Narnia, “talking animals.” Language is the characteristic mark of high intelli-
gence. So I am suggesting that they will become full-fledged persons (rational
substances) who can look back on their lives—both pre- and post-personal—and
form attitudes about what has happened to them and how they fit into God’s
plan. If God is just and loving, and if they are rational and of good will, then they
will accept, though with no loss of the sense of the gravity of their suffering, that
they were an important part of something infinitely valuable, and that in addition
to being justly, lavishly rewarded for it, they will embrace their role in creation. In
this embrace, evil is defeated. (2014: 3)
At first glance, such a proposal seems friendly to Animal Universalism.
Further inspection, however, suggests otherwise. If the cognitive abilities of
animals are enhanced to the extent Dougherty argues they will be, then some
animals may be able to choose against an everlasting life in heaven.60 Such a
possibility would undercut Animal Universalism, since we could not
appreciate certain heavenly goods. But this objection falls prey to our arguments against the
divine construction of a disablist society. Moreover, it implies that the friends and family of those
with profound intellectual disabilities, as well as people with animal companions, will not be
reunited with those that they love in heaven. This is problematic for the reasons cited in our
argument from relational love in Section 9.2. See also our response to The Two Heavens
Objection in this section.
58 Another possibility is that animals are sent to hell. Swinburne (1989: 196–7) raises this
possibility for human infants who died in infancy but rejects it on the grounds that it would be
unjust for God to send human babies to hell. The same seems equally true of animals, who would
(like human infants) suffer there through no fault of their own. This would be both terribly
unjust and profoundly unloving.
59 Dougherty’s purpose is distinct from Swinburne’s since Dougherty intends to develop a
theodicy for the problem of animal pain, whereas Swinburne is merely aiming to cover certain
objections to his account of Heaven.
60 Dougherty nowhere indicates that they will make this choice.
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confidently affirm that all animals will enter heaven and remain there ever-
lastingly. All we could do is hope for the best.61
We offer two replies to this objection. First, whatever we might say about
the permissibility of radical cognitive enhancement simpliciter, the claim that
God will cognitively enhance some individual animal who will then go on to
reject salvation conflicts with a very weak and extremely plausible moral
principle:62
MP: It is pro tanto wrong to intentionally and radically alter an individual’s
decision-making capacity if: (1) that individual does not understand or
consent to the alteration; (2) the alteration goes against that indivi-
dual's best interest; and (3) the alteration does not better satisfy the
interests of any other individuals.63
MP is highly plausible. Any plausible explanation of the general wrongness of
deceptive manipulation, or of drugging a person so that they will have sex with
you, will appeal to either this principle or an even stronger version of this
principle.64 It is very plausible that any act that causes someone harm (thereby
violating condition (2) of MP) without their consent and without benefiting
others (thereby also violating conditions (1) and (3)) is pro tanto wrong.
However, if God intentionally and radically alters any animal’s decision-
making capacity (as is required for the cognitive enhancement proposed by
Swinburne and Dougherty) in a way that causes them to reject heaven, doing
so will conflict with each of the three conditions specified by MP.65
61 Dougherty argues that animals will be cognitively enhanced for the purposes of defeating
evil, and he does not appear to suggest that animals are enhanced to allow them to exercise
choice over the nature of their afterlives. However, as indicated in the main text, the sort of
cognitive enhancement Dougherty envisions carries with it the worry that animals equipped with
full-fledged personhood will choose badly, thereby misusing their newfound enhanced agency,
and this possibility is enough to raise worries for Animal Universalism.
62 Even more plausibly, and importantly, an act of cognitive enhancement that violates the
conditions in MP is not only pro tanto wrong, but also unloving. This is important because that is
all we need for an effective response against the cognitive enhancement objection. Since God is
perfectly loving, God will not act in ways that are unloving. Consequently, since cognitive
enhancements that violate the conditions in MP are unloving, and God’s cognitively enhancing
animals would violate those conditions, God will not cognitively enhance animals as proposed in
the objection.
63 As Matthew Hanser notes, “if it is pro tanto wrong to φ, this is because acts of that type
possess some ‘wrong-making’ feature—some feature that constitutes, or gives rise to, a special
sort of moral reason against φing” (2014: 139).
64 For example, one might think that it is generally wrong to deceptively manipulate a person
even when that deceptive manipulation doesn’t go against that person’s best interest (and so
condition (2) of MP isn’t satisfied), and this is so simply because conditions (1) and (3) of MP are
satisfied. In such cases, an objectionable paternalism is on display.
65 One possible position on divine foreknowledge, open theism, complicates this argument.
For, according to open theism, God does not know what decisions libertarian-free agents will
make. Thus, God does not know whether cognitively enhanced animals with libertarian freedom
will choose for or against Heaven, and cannot know ex ante whether cognitively enhancing a
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It is clear that any radical animal cognitive enhancement meets condition
(1), since no animal has the intellectual ability to understand the nature of
radical cognitive enhancement or its consequences for her life and therefore
cannot consent to it.
Because heaven is uniquely good for animals, it follows that if an animal
permanently rejects heaven, that animal acts against their own best interest.
Therefore, if God radically cognitively enhances some animals such that they
will then choose against heaven, this goes against their best interests. Thus, any
act that cognitively enhances an animal and thereby makes it the case that they
choose against heaven meets condition (2).
Let’s now consider condition (3). For an act of animal cognitive enhance-
ment to avoid (3), that act must satisfy some number of individuals’ interests,
where these individuals’ interests in that enhancement are stronger (individu-
ally or in aggregate) than the enhanced animal’s interest in not missing out in
heaven. But as argued in Section 9.2, God and other inhabitants of heaven
have their interests frustrated if particular animals miss out on heaven, rather
than having their interests satisfied. God loves each animal and desires that the
animal flourish, as does (at least for many animals) each animal’s companions
and family. For any given animal, therefore, others’ interests are satisfied if
that animal enters heaven, and others’ interests are frustrated if that animal
fails to enter heaven. No act of radical cognitive enhancement that causes an
animal to choose against heaven satisfies the interests of any other individuals.
It follows that no such act better satisfies the interests of some number of
individuals than failing to perform that act satisfies the animal’s own interest
in eternal life. That’s identical to condition (3). Swinburne’s cognitive en-
hancement account of animal salvation runs afoul of MP. If there are some
animals who will reject heaven if they are cognitively enhanced, it would be
wrong for God to enhance these animals. And so we have good reason for
rejecting the cognitive enhancement objection to Animal Universalism.
This concludes our first reply to the cognitive enhancement objection. Here
is our second reply. Swinburne’s (and Dougherty’s) invoked account of en-
hanced agency seems implausible. According to Swinburne (1989: 195), it is
important to enhance the cognitive capacities of animals and allow them to
given animal violates condition (2).Therefore, God must employ a model of risk and uncertainty
to decide what to do. On such a model, cognitively enhancing animals could be permissible only
if the expected value of respecting their newly acquired enhanced autonomy outweighed the
actual disvalue of violating conditions (1) and (3) along with the immense expected disvalue of
allowing animals the possibility of choosing against Heaven. It is not at all clear that it does
outweigh such actual and expected disvalue. Moreover, if our second reply to theAgency
Objection succeeds, then cognitively enhancing animals does not respect their autonomy.
Cognitively enhancing these animals could therefore not outweigh the (actual and expected)
disvalue associated with cognitively enhancing a given animal. We conclude that there is no good
reason to think that open theism undermines our reply.
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make decisions about their eternal fates so that they can be made the authors
of their own destinies. In this way, animal salvation is decided not merely on
account of what improves each animal’s welfare, but on account of each
animal’s individual considered judgment. They therefore seem to operate
with an account of enhancement similar to the “mental prosthesis” account
of trusteeship devised by Leslie Francis and Anita Silvers:
[A]s a prosthetic arm or leg executes some of the functions of a missing fleshly
limb without being confused with or supplanting the usual fleshly limb, so, we
propose, a trustee’s reasoning and communicating can execute part or all of a
subject’s own thinking processes without substituting the trustee’s ideas as if it
were the subject’s own. (2009: 485)
In these terms, then, the cognitively enhanced animal functions as a trustee, or
mental prosthesis, for her previous pre-enhanced self. As Francis and Silvers
point out, however, any such cognitive enhancement requires some “standard
of authenticity.” If an individual’s judgments and values after cognitive en-
hancement are radically disconnected from the values and judgments of that
individual prior to enhancement, it cannot rightly be said that that individual
has been decisionally empowered or that she has had her autonomy advanced,
and she cannot rightly be said to be the ultimate author of her later values and
judgments.
If, for example, a scientist were to unilaterally cognitively enhance Donald
Trump (a process not involving Trump’s own rational agency and deliber-
ation) and after the enhancement Trump wanted nothing more than to
concoct a genius plan to resolve the world refugee crisis whilst opening up
the US border to all immigrants, a value utterly disconnected from his prior
values and judgments, Trump cannot rightly be said to have authentically
decided to open the US border. Rather, it is more plausible to suppose that the
scientist who enhanced Trump is the author of this decision, and Trump’s
autonomy has been imposed upon.66 Similarly, the ideas and deliberative
process of a radically cognitively enhanced individual cannot truly be said to
be authored by that individual “except where the subject is the sole inspiration
for the conceptualization the trustee advances” (Silvers and Francis 2009: 493).
Further, as Jeff McMahan and David Wasserman argue, an individual’s
mere inspiration of some decision is not sufficient to establish that individual’s
agency over or authorship of that decision (Wasserman and McMahan 2012:
331). To use McMahan and Wasserman’s analogy, “a suit, however closely
fitted, is made by the tailor, not the wearer. Even if the wearer indicates where
the fit is too tight or loose, her role is far too passive to make her a co-creator”
(331). In order for mental prosthesis or radical cognitive enhancement to truly
66 We thank David Wasserman for this example, which was proposed to one author in
conversation.
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make an individual animal an author or co-creator of decisions about her
eternal destiny, that animal must first have the requisite ability to see herself as
a temporally extended being and engage in simple practical reasoning. She
must have certain values and judgments about reasons that can be extended
and improved upon through the process of cognitive enhancement if she is to
be the ultimate origin of her later values, rather than being the subject of a kind
of imposition or manipulation. Thus, for most animals—those without any
capacity for propositional agency—using radical cognitive enhancement to
promote authentic judgments is not a genuine possibility. Judgments made by
radically cognitively enhanced animals would be no more (and perhaps less)
authentic than the judgments of a sympathetic third-party observer. Given
this, it makes most sense for a perfectly loving and just God to do what is in
each animal’s best interests rather than giving them a counterfeit form of
agency which could ultimately cause them harm by resulting in their non-
existence or continued existence in an eternally bad state.
The Two Heavens Objection. As a final reply, one might object that the
arguments from divine justice and divine love only entail that God will
guarantee that all animals live in a perfectly good, eternal state. This does
not entail that these animals must inhabit heaven, which might be reserved for
human, propositional agents alone. God might simply place all animals,
infants, and profoundly intellectually disabled people in a separate heaven
far, far away.67
But such an arrangement would be incompatible with God’s perfect justice
and love. First, as argued in reply to the Nature of Heaven Objection, perfect
justice is incompatible with systematically excluding individuals from society
merely on account of their lacking certain capabilities. This is true even if the
two heavens (or three or four, etc.) are “separate but equal,” such that
individuals in each heaven will live a supremely good life. Just as it would be
unjust for God to set up two heavens for white people and people of color, or
men and women, or cisgender and non-cisgender people, it would be unjust
for God to set up two heavens, one for propositional agents and one for those
lacking propositional agency. It’s hard to see how such a segregationist
heavenly arrangement could constitute the ultimate and final restoration of
the created order.
Second, as argued in our second argument from divine love, many humans
with different talents and capabilities, children, and animals share rich and
meaningful relationships that add value to their lives. Dividing the citizens of
heaven without extremely compelling reason would surely be unloving, as it
would end meaningful relationships between citizens of different heavens and
would prevent the citizens of each heaven from forming new, meaningful
67 Swinburne (1989: 196) raises this possibility for human infants who died in infancy.
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relationships. In some, but not all, ways this sort of arrangement bears a
striking resemblance to the imposition of the Berlin Wall, effectively separat-
ing family members, friends, and neighbors from one another.
We conclude, therefore, that the Survival Objection, the Nature of Heaven
Objection, the Agency Objection, and the Two Heavens Objection fail to defeat
our case for Animal Universalism.
9 .5 . CONCLUSION
We have defended Animal Universalism, the thesis that all sentient animals
will be brought to heaven and remain there for eternity. We began by
motivating the views that animals have direct moral status and that God has
duties to beings with direct moral status. We continued with Arguments from
Divine Love, according to which God loves each individual animal perfectly,
and therefore maximizes each individual animal’s well-being. Because God
would fail to maximize each individual animal’s well-being if any animal failed
to be in heaven for all eternity, Animal Universalism follows.
We then provided Arguments from Divine Justice. These arguments show
that God ought not to withhold opportunities from animals on any morally
arbitrary grounds, including degree of intelligence or species. We then showed
how animals possess all that is necessary to reap the benefits of heaven (or of
some possible afterlife): sentience. Thus, animals have all they need to qualify
for the basic demand of justice to have an equal opportunity to enter and
remain within heaven. Furthermore, animals will not decline such an oppor-
tunity, which entails that they will be ushered into heaven and remain there
forevermore. As this is true of all animals, Animal Universalism follows. We
then offered another argument from justice which also supports Animal
Universalism.
Far more could be said in defense of Animal Universalism. Our case
motivates the two central defensive pillars for Animal Universalism: love
and justice. The nature of divine perfect love and divine perfect justice strongly
supports Animal Universalism.
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